| 跨行政区流域水污染治理的政策博弈及启示 |
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| 引用本文：李胜,陈晓春.跨行政区流域水污染治理的政策博弈及启示[J].湖南大学学报社会科学版,2010,(1): |
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| 李胜 陈晓春 |
| 湖南大学工商管理学院; |
| 基金项目:湖南大学两型社会研究院重点项目”低碳经济与两型社会的公共政策创新研究”(LXZD200801)资助 |
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| 中文摘要:环境政策的形成和执行是一个多方博弈的过程,中国的环境治理已进入以利益为核心的政策博弈阶段。通过对流域水污染治理政策博弈的动因分析,我们发现政府间利益冲突的显性化,流域功能区划的不完善,流域资源的准公共产品性质以及环境法治有效性的不足等原因造成了在流域治理中的政策博弈。根据政策博弈模型要构建在流域治理中的合作行为,需要进一步完善中央政府和地方政府的职能,加强对地方政府的监管,减少信息不对称,推动公众环境参与和提高环境法治执行力。 |
| 中文关键词:跨行政区 流域 水污染 治理 政策博弈 |
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| The Policy Game and Enlightenment of Trans-boundary River Basin Water Pollution Governance |
| LI Sheng CHEN Xiao-chun |
| School of Business Admininstration;Hunan University;Changsha 410082;China |
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| Abstract:The promulgation and implementation of environmental policy is a multi-game process.China's environmental governance has entered a new stage which focuses on interests as the core of policy game.Through the motive analysis of river basin water pollution governance policy game,we found that the intense of interest conflict among government,the imperfect of basin functional area planning,the nature of quasi-public goods of basin resources,the inefficient of environment law and so on are the main reasons in wa... |
| keywords:trans-boundary river basin water pollution governance policy game |
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