| 金融机构“大而不倒”问题与解决方案研究 |
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| 引用本文：隋平，陈平凡.金融机构“大而不倒”问题与解决方案研究[J].湖南大学学报社会科学版,2013,(5):146-151 |
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| 中文摘要:“大而不倒”问题源于系统重要性大型金融机构突然倒闭会引爆系统性风险，这迫使政府对其救助，滋生了道德风险，加剧金融系统中的风险累积。因此，对于系统重要性金融机构应在统一监管框架之下，设定事前的审慎监管机制，并约束其复杂性和不透明性。同时，对于发生问题的系统重要性金融机构应采取风险定价合理的事后救助措施，对确实不能救助的则应当保证对其进行有序清算，避免对金融体系造成系统性负面冲击。 |
| 中文关键词:大而不倒 系统性风险 道德风险 |
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| Problem of “Too-Big-to-Fail” and Its Solution |
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| Abstract:The financial crisis of 2007-2009 highlights the urgency of regulating “too-big-to-fail” financial institutions. The sudden collapse of those financial institutions with systemic importance would cause great negative shock to financial system. However, arbitrary prevention to the collapse of trouble-ridden financial institution also have the problem of giving rise to moral hazard. Therefore, appropriate regulation should be in place to set up ex ante mechanism to control systemic risk of such “too-big-to fail” financial institutions on the one hand and ex post regimes to rescue or resolve them without causing moral hazard on the another hand. |
| keywords:Too-Big-to-Fail Systemic Risk Moral Hazard |
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