董事责任保险能否改善企业投资效率?——基于中国A股上市公司的经验证据
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引用本文:胡国柳,李少华.董事责任保险能否改善企业投资效率?——基于中国A股上市公司的经验证据[J].湖南大学学报社会科学版,2014,(2):41-46
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作者单位
胡国柳,李少华 (海南大学 经济与管理学院海南 海口570228) 
中文摘要:财务丑闻的曝光,使得企业董事及高管面临严格的监管审查并导致其执业风险不断加大,由此促使作为董事和高管的风险分散与权益保障机制的董事责任保险需求愈发凸显,但是董事责任保险并非万能的保护伞。正确认识董事责任保险与企业投资效率的关系,对于企业管理层和监管部门制定相关政策具有重要意义。
中文关键词:董事责任保险  过度投资  投资不足  非效率投资
 
Can Directors Liability Insurance Improve the Investment Efficiency? ——Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies
Abstract:The exposed of financial scandals making corporate directors and executives facing regulatory scrutiny and increasing the risk of its practice, thereby contributing to the demand for directors liability insurance which is a mechanisms of dispersing the risk of directors and executives and protecting their rights become more prominent, but the director liability insurance is not an omnipotent umbrella. Correctly understand the relationship between corporate directors liability insurance and investment efficiency is important for enterprise management and the regulatory authorities to make the relevant policies.
keywords:Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance  overinvestment  underinvestment  inefficient investment
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