| 建筑节能监管体系中消费者与房地产开发商之间诚信博弈模型 |
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| 引用本文：邓建英，兰秋军.建筑节能监管体系中消费者与房地产开发商之间诚信博弈模型[J].湖南大学学报社会科学版,2014,(3):66-69 |
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| 中文摘要:在推行建筑节能政策的流程中，消费者因购买节能或不节能建筑房，与房地产开发商之间产生节能信号博弈，由此机理构建诚信博弈模型。在此模型中，房地产开发商行动在先，消费者行动在后，带来了二者之间诚信博弈的三种均衡状态：诚信均衡、混合均衡与准诚信均衡。通过模型求解推断进行经济解释，房地产开发商应加大诚信宣传力度，向消费者如实传递节能信息，利于消费者正确作出判断，并出价买房，从而推动节能建筑市场良性发展。 |
| 中文关键词:诚信传递 节能建筑 均衡最优 |
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| An Honesty Game Model Between Consumers and Property Developers in the Regulatory System of Energy-efficient Building |
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| Abstract:In the process of implementing policies for energy-efficient building, consumers' decisions on whether selecting energy-efficient building start a signalling game with property developers. With that mechanism, the game model is constructed to analyze honesty and dishonesty. In the model, developers move first, and then consumers follow up, which generates three equilibria of the incomplete information game: the separating equilibrium, the pooling equilibrium and the semi-separating equilibrium. With the solution to and its economic explanations for the model, this paper advocates that developers should intensify their publicity and promotion with integrity to communicate to the public the information of their energy-efficient buildings to guide consumers in their decisions, and thus promote the development of the market of energy-efficient buildings. |
| keywords:honesty signaling energy-efficient building equilibrium optimum |
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