财政纵向失衡、地方政府税收努力与资本错配
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引用本文:赵 娜1,2,李光勤3,李香菊4.财政纵向失衡、地方政府税收努力与资本错配[J].湖南大学学报社会科学版,2020,(6):83-91
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赵 娜1,2,李光勤3,李香菊4 (1. 西安外国语大学 人文社会科学研究中心陕西 西安 710128
2. 西安外国语大学 经济金融学院陕西 西安 710128
3. 安徽财经大学 国际经济贸易学院安徽 蚌埠 233030
4. 西安交通大学 经济与金融学院陕西 西安 710061) 
中文摘要:财政纵向失衡对资本错配有直接效应和间接效应。以我国30个地区2002-2017年数据为基础,本研究通过构建面板联立方程模型探究了财政纵向失衡、地方政府税收努力与资本错配之间的内在联系。结果表明,财政纵向失衡对资本错配既有直接效应,又通过地方政府税收努力对资本错配具有间接效应,即财政纵向失衡程度的提高降低了地方政府税收努力,而地方政府税收努力的降低扭曲了资本配置效率。
中文关键词:财政纵向失衡  资本错配  地方政府税收努力  联立方程模型
 
Fiscal Vertical Imbalance,Local Government Tax Efforts and Capital Mismatch
Abstract:This paper explains the direct and indirect effects of fiscal vertical imbalance on capital mismatch systematically. Then, based on the data of 30 regions in China from 2002 to 2017, this paper empirically explores the internal relationship between fiscal vertical imbalance, local government tax efforts and capital mismatch by constructing panel simultaneous equation model. The results show that fiscal vertical imbalance has direct effects on capital mismatch. And it has indirect effects on capital mismatch through local government tax efforts. That is, the increase of fiscal vertical imbalance reduces local government tax efforts, while the reduction of local government tax efforts distorts the efficiency of capital allocation.
keywords:fiscal vertical imbalance  capital mismatch  local government tax efforts  simultaneous equation model
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