控股股东股权质押是否会影响企业投资效率?——基于中国A股上市公司的证据
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引用本文:顾海峰,张 晶.控股股东股权质押是否会影响企业投资效率?——基于中国A股上市公司的证据[J].湖南大学学报社会科学版,2023,(3):41-53
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顾海峰,张 晶 (东华大学 旭日工商管理学院上海 200051) 
中文摘要:文章选取2010-2020年中国A股上市公司年度数据,采用面板回归模型对控股股东股权质押对企业投资效率的影响及其作用机制进行了实证分析。研究表明:(1)控股股东股权质押对企业投资效率具有抑制作用。相对于国有与高社会责任企业,控股股东股权质押对非国有与低社会责任企业投资效率的影响更为明显。(2)控股股东股权质押会降低投资不足状态企业的投资效率,但有助于提升投资过度状态企业的投资效率,这归因于控股股东股权质押引发的企业融资约束效应。(3)控股股东股权质押主要通过加大企业金融化及助推大股东掏空渠道来抑制企业投资效率,“控股股东股权质押-企业金融化/大股东掏空-企业投资效率”的传导渠道均有效。(4)股权制衡度与审计质量对两者关系均具有正向调节作用,股权制衡度与审计质量的提高均会加剧控股股东股权质押对企业投资效率的抑制作用。
中文关键词:股权质押  投资效率  企业金融化  大股东掏空  股权制衡度
 
Does Controlling Shareholder’s Equity Pledge Affect Enterprise Investment Efficiency?——Evidence from Chinese A-share Listed Companies
Abstract:This paper conducts an empirical study on the influence of equity pledge by controlling shareholders on investment efficiency and its mechanism with the annual data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2020. The results show that: (1) Equity pledge of controlling shareholders has an inhibitory effect on investment efficiency of enterprises. Compared with state-owned and high socially responsible enterprises, controlling shareholder’s equity pledge has a more significant impact on the investment efficiency of non-state-owned and low socially responsible enterprises. (2) Controlling shareholder’s equity pledge can reduce the investment efficiency of enterprises in the state of underinvestment, but help to improve the investment efficiency of enterprises in the state of overinvestment, which is attributed to the financing constraint effect caused by controlling shareholder’s equity pledge. (3) The controlling shareholder equity pledge by reducing corporate financialization level and the degree of major shareholders hollowing channel to curb corporate investment efficiency, and shareholder equity pledge-enterprise financialization/major shareholders hollowing-investment efficiency financialization/big shareholders of transmission channels and effective. (4) Both the equity balance degree and audit quality have a positive moderating effect on the relationship, and the improvement of both the equity balance degree and audit quality will intensify the restraining effect of controlling shareholders’ equity pledge on enterprise investment efficiency.
keywords:equity pledge  investment efficiency  enterprise financialization  major shareholders hollowing  equity balance
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