国有机构投资者对税收规避程度的影响及机制
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引用本文:曹 越,朱迎新,杜 晶,唐奕可.国有机构投资者对税收规避程度的影响及机制[J].湖南大学学报社会科学版,2023,(4):77-87
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曹 越,朱迎新,杜 晶,唐奕可 (湖南大学 工商管理学院湖南 长沙 410082) 
中文摘要:利用2015-2021年A股上市公司数据,实证检验国有机构投资者持股对税收规避的影响及机制。结果表明:国有机构投资者持股显著降低了被持股企业的税收规避程度。影响机制分析结果显示,国有机构投资者持股通过缓解融资约束、降低信息不对称方式抑制企业税收规避。异质性检验表明,国有机构投资者持股在外部融资成本更高、内部代理问题更加严重的企业中更能够发挥抑制税收规避的作用。拓展性分析发现,国有机构投资者持股时间越长,抑制税收规避的程度越高;国有机构投资者持股相比国有股权及其他机构投资者持股更能够发挥抑制税收规避的作用。
中文关键词:国有机构投资者  税收规避  融资约束  信息不对称
 
Impact and Mechanism of State-owned Institutional Investor Ownership on the Degree of Tax Avoidance
Abstract:This paper uses a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies’ data from 2015 to 2021 to empirically examine the impact and mechanism of state-owned institutional investor ownership on corporate tax avoidance. The result reveals that the state-owned institutional investor ownership significantly reduces the degree of tax avoidance. The mechanism test shows that the state-owned institutional investor ownership reduces corporate tax avoidance by alleviating financial constraints and reducing information asymmetry. Heterogeneity analysis shows that state-owned institutional investor ownership is more effective in reducing tax avoidance in corporates with higher external financing costs and more serious internal agency problems. The results of the expansion analysis shows that the longer the state-owned institutional investors hold shares, the higher the degree of inhibiting tax avoidance. The state-owned institutional investor ownership is more effective in reducing tax avoidance than state ownership and other institutional investor ownership.
keywords:state-owned institutional investors  tax avoidance  financial constraint  information asymmetry
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