| 共同富裕背景下银行“小而不存”难题及克服 |
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| 引用本文：曲光毅.共同富裕背景下银行“小而不存”难题及克服[J].湖南大学学报社会科学版,2024,(3):55-63 |
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| 中文摘要:我国金融监管旨在防止系统性金融风险，与之相匹配的“强监管”政策表现为监管规范的数量、强度和密度的增加。由于监管的复杂性、重复执行和不确定性，商业银行的合规成本上升，利润空间减小。我国监管规范大多采取“一体适用”的模式，针对不同规模的银行作区分式和多元化的监管不明显。小型银行较大中型银行更容易因“强监管”而运营困难，情况严重时会在金融市场上寻求合并或进入破产程序，引发“小而不存”的问题。金融是推动共同富裕的重要工具，小型银行对普惠金融和共同富裕有着重要作用，因此，“小而不存”难题悬而不决将带来严重后果。转变现有资产定义模式为活动定义模式是克服路径之一；将具有衡量性的法律原则——比例原则应用于银行监管以解决“小而不存”难题是克服路径之二。 |
| 中文关键词:共同富裕 银行监管 “小而不存” 比例原则 |
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| Too Small to Survive and Its Solutions in the Context of Common Prosperity |
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| Abstract:Financial regulation in China aims to mitigate systemic financial risks. This objective is pursued through a strict regulation policy, which manifests in heightened amounts, intensities, and concentrations of regulatory norms. The complexity, repetitive nature, and uncertainty of regulation have led to increased compliance costs for commercial banks, thereby reducing their profit. Most regulatory norms in China adopt the mode of one size fits all , not obviously accounting for differences in bank sizes or offer diversified regulation. Small banks are more prone to operational difficulties than large and medium-sized banks, in severe cases, they may seek mergers in financial markets or enter bankruptcy proceedings, thus causing the problem of too small to survive. Finance serves as a vital instrument for fostering common prosperity, with small banks playing a crucial role in promoting inclusive finance. Consequently, failing to address that the too small to survive could have severe repercussions. One solution involves transitioning from the current asset-based definition to activity-based definition. Another solution to overcome this problem is to apply the principle of proportionality to banking regulations. |
| keywords:common prosperity banking regulation too small to survive the principle of proportionality |
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